1 - This is NOT legal advice, which condo & Building Scheme Directors & service providers should obtain - AND LISTEN TO - from licensed & insured members of the Law Society of Ontario !
Issued in November 2017 Callow v (Zollinger) CMG et al has NOT appeared on any Top Ten 2017 judgment lists. This is NOT a management-friendly decision.
2 - In litigation that included formal hearings over 8 days, the Ottawa Superior Court decision ( by Madame Justice Michelle O’Bonsawin ) hits a contract termination at a ten corporation grouping of condominium lowrises west of Walkley-Heron Roads.
These client corporations are jointly cited as forming a JUC Joint use Committee collectively serving “Baycrest Gardens” but with a common PMC & a property manager ( unfortunately for her cited topmost within the judgment's citation ).
Against snowplow contractor Callow's claim of Bad Faith contract termination issued by CMG 6 weeks ahead of year 2 of a two year contract, the 'LITERALLY COMPLIANT' Contract Termination here gets held effectively undercut & in bad faith ( ie that what the judge held six months of alleged 'active deception' was an actionable breach of the Supreme Court of Canada's new Honesty Duty ).
Open to potential defence were such as :
Literal Compliance eg : "We lawfully terminated without cause being necessary with no less than the minimum Notice period agreed to freely by the plaintiff Callow" etc. "Callow entered a contract which neither expressly prohibited Termination on the brink of the winter season nor deadlined the Notice".
Entirety of Agreement - is it relevant ? The 2017 Ottawa snowplowing judgment is silent as to any Entirety of Agreement provision in the terminated Agreement , but Canada's Supreme Court decision in Bhasin ( 2014 ) expressly cites & overrides one such in the disputed Alberta renewal dispute.
"We claim inadequate performance by snowplower Callow !" Is that relevant & credible ? : Madame Justice O’Bonsawin also opines that the defendants' performance complaints ( against snowplower Callow ) in this litigation are unsupported. The alleged under-performance would have also occurred at least SIX MONTHS before the September 2013 Termination.
"That it's a huge & unsupported judicial leap to platform alleged bad faith on a mere JUC client recommendation to management . . . What status if any did the JUC motion have as to the literal contract ?"
And even if somehow "active deception", just how much lost income could be attributed where Callow did not perform the second winter & had at least 6 weeks to mitigate by finding other clients ?
If appealed, there could be a lot of such arguments repeated.
3 - Had there been SIX MONTHS of deliberately secreted INTENTION TO TERMINATE the second year of Callow's snowplowing contract until just 6 weeks before snow season ?
( Motive : to avoid disruption to summer landscape activity contracted separately to the plaintiff Callow. )
Would such be even adequate to reasonably constitute "active" deception ?
Xxcrpt from Callow v CMG et al :
quote " . . . [38] The Minutes indicate that “ ( CMG’s individual co-defendant property manager Ms XXX is considering terminating the snow removal contract with CM Callow due to poor workmanship in the 2012-13 winter”.
In fact, the Minutes continue to state that Ms. XXX had reviewed the contract and advised the JUC members that they could terminate the contract with Callow with no financial penalty.
She advised that she would get quotes from other snow removal contractors. In response to Callow’s counsel’s demand letter, Ms. XXX states that the JUC made the determination to terminate Callow’s winter maintenance services contract on March 19, 2013, and it was a unanimous decision. . . .
. . . . [48] On July 17, 2013, there were e-mails between ( client Directors P. and C. ). Counsel for Callow submits that these are very relevant because they are private communications between them.
These two men never expected that they would be disclosed during this proceeding.
I agree with her.
Mr. C e-mailed Mr. P on July 17, 2013, regarding the “freebie” work: “Yeah, I was talking to him about it last week and he was mentioning he was going to do that. He’s basically doing this to try and make sure we keep him for summer grounds, which is fine by me.”
Mr. P then responds: “I figured as much. It’s nice he’s doing it but I am sure it’s an attempt at us keeping him.
Btw, I was talking to him last week and he is under the impression we’re keeping him for winter again.
I didn’t say a word cuz I don’t wanna get involved but I did tell ( Ms XXX ) that Callow thinks we’re keeping him for winter.”
[49] Mr. Callow was only advised by way of e-mail from Ms. XXX on September 12, 2013:
“Please be advised that Baycrest will not be requiring your services for the winter contract for 2013/2014 season, as per section 9 of the contract, Baycrest needs to provide the contractor with 10 days’ notice.”
Mr. Callow testified that immediately after he received the termination notice, he reached out to both Mr. P. and Mr. C. Mr. Callow believed that if there was a problem, he would have expected them to bring it to his attention like they had done in the past.
Callow entered into the contract with CMG under good faith.
Mr. Callow testified: “After reading this, it is pretty obvious that they used me, misled and lied to me.” I agree. . . " unquote
4 - The above Director E-MAILS & March 2013 alleged JUC client Directors decision to terminate the snowplow contract : ARE THEY IRRELEVANT ?
Do both fail to support a finding of "active" concealment by CMG ? What's an "active" misleading, as opposed to lawful silence or prudent desire not to risk collateral retaliation ?
Regardless, IF there is an appeal, will CMG succeed in distancing the actual September 2013 termination from the alleged "active misleading" aspect ?
5 - Xcrpted Madam Justice O'Bomsawin :
quote " . . . [65] In Callow’s case, CMG actively deceived Callow from the time the decision was made to terminate the winter maintenance services contract in either March or April to September 12, 2013.
More specifically, CMG acted in bad faith by
(1) withholding the information to ensure Callow performed the summer maintenance services contract; and
(2) continuing to represent that the contract was not in danger despite CMG’s knowledge that Callow was taking on extra tasks to bolster the chances of renewing the winter maintenance services contract.
[66] CMG argue that on its own, the exercise of the contractual right of termination is not evidence of a breach as there was no positive obligation on CMG to disclose their intention to terminate the contract before the ten days’ notice.
CMG further state that Callow has not successfully provided evidence of bad faith in the decision to delay.
I disagree. There were active communications between the parties between March/April and September 12, 2013, which deceived Callow.
Due to the active deception by CMG, I do not accept the argument that no duty was owed to disclose the decision to terminate the contract before the notice.
[67] CMG did not perform the contract pursuant to the minimum standard of honesty.
CMG’s delay to provide notice to Callow failed to provide a fair opportunity for the latter to protect its interests.
The minimum standard of honesty would have been to address the alleged performance issues, to provide prompt notice, or to refrain from any representations in anticipation of the notice period.
[68] Although the scope of good faith may be broader in the franchise and employment context, principles from these areas provide guidance.
In the employment context, it is recognized that there is a duty to act in good faith when terminating an employee.
In this case, Callow was not an employee. However, as a result of Bhasin, it is arguable that the duty to act in good faith in performing a contract also extends to terminating a contract. . . .
. . . [83] For the reasons noted previously, I order that CMG must pay Callow the amounts as follows:
(a) $64,306.96 for the value of the contract after expenses;
(b) $14,835.14 for the value of one year of the lease of equipment; and
(c) $1,600.00 for the last unpaid invoice. . . " unquote
5 - Footnote :
- This Ottawa judge in Sep 2017 turfed most of a grotesque $20 K award imposed in a Small Claims award against an Ottawa condo owner who lost a $ 2,500 challenge of a charge back SEE
http://ontario.cafcor.org/index.php?option=com_fireboard&Itemid=46&func=view&catid=2&id=18830#18830- from 2017 Superior Court ( East ) appointee Madame Justice Michelle O'Bonsawin 's appointment biography :
Justice O'Bonsawin holds a B.A. (Laurentian University), an LL.B. (University of Ottawa), and an LL.M. (Osgoode Hall), and is currently enrolled in the University of Ottawa's Ph.D. program in law.
She began her legal career with the RCMP Legal Services and later was counsel with Canada Post Corporation, specializing in labour, employment, human rights, and privacy law.
Prior to her appointment, Justice O'Bonsawin was general counsel for the Royal Ottawa Health Care Group, where she developed a specialization in mental health law. She has taught Indigenous law part-time in the University of Ottawa's French common law program.
She serves on the Board of Governors of the University of Ottawa, as well as its Executive Committee.
Justice O'Bonsawin also acts as a mentor in the Canadian Bar Association, Ontario Bar Association, and University of Ottawa mentorship programs.